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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Namibia’s Currency Peg to the South African rand on its Domestic 
Inflation 
 
This study analyses the impact of Namibia’s currency peg on its domestic inflation. This 
is because theoretical argument suggests that currency peg (fixed exchange rate) provides 
nominal anchor for domestic price level, in particular when the domestic currency is 
pegged to a stable foreign currency. Following the method of hypothesis testing, data on 
Namibia and South Africa are used in this regard. Three main findings emerged from this 
study. Firstly, it was shown that the two inflation rates are positively correlated. 
Secondly, the study shows that there is no statistical significance difference between the 
inflation rates of the two countries.  This gives an indication that the currency peg served 
as a nominal anchor, because as the SA inflation rate came down, so did the Namibian 
inflation rate. Thirdly, the study also shows that the growth of money stock in Namibia 
does not deviate from the growth of money stock in SA. This gives an indication that the 
authorities have maintained the peg through control of monetary growth.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Pegging the national currency to an international anchor currency may enhance the 
credibility of anti-inflation policy (Chow and Kim, 2003:332). It is generally accepted 
that it would be very difficult for a central bank to be effective in its pursuit of price 
stability if there should be the perception that it is not prepared to serve strong monetary 
medicine if that is what the economy requires. The perception that the central bank is 
prepared to make the tough or unpopular decisions is what gives it “credibility” in terms 
of its anti-inflation policy. A currency peg can be seen as something that strengthens such 
a perception of credibility. Then economic agents can be more certain about policy, in 
particular when the central bank chooses a target that is easily and clearly understood by 
the agents in the economy (Sperling, 2001:3). For developing countries, a hard peg might 
be the most suitable exchange rate regime towards achieving low inflation levels 
(Harrigan, 2006:206). Von Hagen and Zhou (2005:679) show that exchange rate regime 
choice is dictated by inflation rates, cumulative inflation differentials and international 
reserves sufficiency. Therefore, it implies that for developing countries, pegs or an 
exchange-rate anchor allows policy-makers in countries with a high tendency to inflation, 
to import credibility and low inflation (Adams, 2005:21).  
 
At time of independence (1990), Namibia decided to remain within the Common 
Monetary Area1 (CMA). In 1993 the Namibian dollar (Namibian currency) was 
introduced. It was then pegged to the South African rand on a one-to-one basis. The 
decision to remain in the CMA means monetary policy is abandoned, giving priority to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate against the rand (BON, 2000:23). Prior to the 
establishment of the Namibian dollar in 1993, a separate bilateral agreement between 
Namibia and South Africa on features of the peg was already in place in 1992 (Kalenga, 
2001:3). One could state that the 1992 bilateral agreement was in anticipation of the peg 
in 1993, because the bilateral agreement also provides that “either contracting party has 
                                                 
1 This arrangement is formerly known as Rand Monetary Area, which consisted of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa. Botswana moved out in 1976 and Namibia joined in 1990 after attaining her 
independence. The Common Monetary Area is now comprised of the following members Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa. 
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the right to issue its own national currency” (BON, 2000:23). In particular, Article 4, 
Section 1 of the Bilateral monetary agreement, states that, “Against the aggregate 
amount of Namibian dollar currency issued by the Bank of Namibia, the Bank of Namibia 
shall maintain a reserve equivalent thereto in the form of Rand assets and freely usable 
foreign currencies in such proportion as the Bank of Namibia considers appropriate...” 
(BON, 2000:23). This section means the need to fulfil the backing rules, which is why the 
1993 peg was on par (Kalenga, 2001:3).   
 
The two dominant features of the bilateral agreement are: (1) a commitment by the Bank 
of Namibia (BON) to convert domestic currency into foreign reserves (SA rand) at a 
fixed exchange rate, and (2) an explicit requirement that the BON monetary liabilities be 
backed by the reserve currency (the rand) or other foreign assets (Kalenga, 2001:3). For 
Namibia, even after the introduction of the Namibian dollar, the rand remained legal 
tender in Namibia. A fixed parity (one-to-one) between the Namibian dollar, with respect 
to the rand, had been maintained, backed 100% by foreign exchange reserves. However, 
the fixed parity is not irrevocable (Tjirongo, 1995:23).  
 
As stated earlier, pegging the exchange rate provides a nominal anchor that can help in 
controlling domestic inflation (Mishkin, 1998:82). In this instance, the historical trade 
relations and close ties between the Namibian and SA economies, led to the decision that 
the SA rand provides a stable anchor for low inflation in Namibia (Kalenga, 2001:3). 
Although a currency peg can be used as anti-inflationary policy, recent price trends in 
Namibia prompt one to ask whether the pegged exchange rate was effective as a 
“nominal anchor” to curtail inflation. This is the issue of concern in this paper.  
 
In light of the above the limitation of the research is not to develop a model for the 
determination of the equilibrium exchange rate, nor is it to develop a model that tests for 
the relative contributions of various economic factors to the nominal exchange rate of 
Namibia. The exchange rate is in any case pegged to the rand. Therefore, the limited 
objective of the research is to determine how effective the pegged exchange rate was over 
the past 15 years as a nominal anchor, i.e. as a means of containing domestic inflation in 
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Namibia to similar rates as found in South Africa. The significance of the research is that 
it will contribute towards filling a gap in the literature, namely whether the pegged 
exchange rate has served as an effective nominal anchor. Given the absence of work in 
this area any light thrown on this question will contribute towards our understanding of 
the impact of the currency peg on Namibia’s domestic inflation. 
 
In investigating the question stated above, the study is divided into five chapters. 
Following this chapter is the literature review aimed at providing an understanding of 
currency peg. Of particular interest is the debate on the use of a currency peg as an anti-
inflationary policy in fighting inflation: a nominal occurrence. Chapter 3 presents the data 
sources and appropriate econometric techniques to be used to analyze the data in 
addressing the question posed earlier. Chapter 4 discusses analyses of exchange rate 
policy and inflation in Namibia. This is aimed at giving an indication of the inflation 
trends in the Namibian economy in the pre-pegging and post-pegging periods. The 
chapter further analyses the post-pegging era in the context of macro-economic 
conditions, taking into account factors such as fiscal policy, monetary policy and balance 
of payment flows. This is to test the hypothesis that the Namibian dollar peg to the South 
African rand was effective in curtailing inflation in Namibia. Chapter 5 concludes the 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the literature review on currency pegs and inflation. Section 2.2 
briefly explains the meaning of a currency peg, different types of pegs and how it 
operates. This is to assist in understanding the concept of a currency peg. Section 2.3 
presents merits and limitations of a currency peg particularly those pertaining to inflation. 
This is to show that low inflation is among the benefits of pegging. In other words, to 
back it up with theoretical arguments, that a currency peg can curtail inflation (i.e. serve 
as a nominal anchor). A review of related empirical literature aimed at testing the 
theoretical propositions is discussed in this section. Of particular interest is the 
affirmation and consistency of propositions that a currency peg served as a nominal 
anchor in controlling inflation. Section 2.4 sums up the main points in the chapter.  
 
2.2 The Pegged Exchange Rate 
 
A pegged exchange rate is one in which the exchange rate of the home currency is fixed 
to an anchor currency (Tiwari, 2003:2). It is artificially maintained by the government 
(Abel and Bernanke, 2005:496). This definition has been extended by Bleaney and 
Fielding (1999: 14), who stated that pegging can either be to a single currency or to a 
basket of currencies. Wessels (2007:708) further demonstrates that currency pegs can be 
set at different levels because there are different levels of inflexibility. This includes 
conventional fixed pegs, crawling pegs, horizontal bands, crawling bands or hard (fixed) 
peg exchange rate such as currency board and dollarisation (El-Mefleh, 2004:50 and 
Fischer, 2001:3). 
  
Since these pegged exchange rate arrangements differ in terms of varying levels of 
flexibility, different countries adopt currency pegs deemed reasonable to correspond with 
their economic conditions (Fischer, 2001:21). Frankel (2000) cited by Fischer (2001:21) 
relates to this statement by arguing that; “reflecting wide differences in levels of 
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economic and financial development and in other aspects of their economic situations, no 
single exchange rate regime is most appropriate for all such countries, and the regime that 
is appropriate for a particular country may change over time”. Experience has shown that 
pegged exchange rate arrangements target different objectives. For this study, the focus is 
on using a pegged exchange rate as nominal anchor, as a policy objective of a currency 
peg.  
 
2.3 Currency Peg as a Nominal Anchor 
 
According to Mishkin (1998:82-83), fixing the value of the domestic currency relative to 
that of a more stable currency, which is exactly what an exchange-rate peg involves, 
provides a stable nominal anchor for the economy. Giucci and Trebesch (2004:3) 
extended this argument by adding that pegging would provide a nominal and credible 
anchor for the economy. However, Von Hagen and Zhou (2005:687) are of an opinion 
that a pegged (fixed) exchange rate could provide a nominal anchor for domestic prices, 
should credible monetary institutions be non-existent. This suggests that for countries 
where credible monetary institutions exist, a nominal anchor would not be necessary. In 
light of the preceding statement, Barro and Gordon (1983) cited in Von Hagen and Zhou 
(2005:686), argued to the contrary that, “countries whose monetary authorities suffer 
from low credibility of low-inflation policies can import central bank credibility by 
adopting a fixed exchange rate with a more stable currency”. 
 
Flood and Mussa (1994:1) also emphasized this point, but differently, by arguing that a 
nominal anchor could be provided because a pegged exchange rate arrangement means 
that a country pegging its currency or “joining in a fixed parity arrangement” uses a 
currency peg as a nominal anchor. 
 
Gould (1999:7) argued contrary to Von Hagen and Zhou (2005:686) and Flood and 
Mussa (1994:1) that countries lacking low credibility of low inflation policies cannot use 
a pegged exchange rate as a nominal anchor, because a pegged rate requires a high level 
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of international reserves, which those countries might not have. However, Gould’s 
argument was not left unchallenged. Tiwari (2003:24), for example, indicates that, for as 
long as the country makes an institutional commitment under a pegged exchange rate 
arrangement, a currency peg is practicable. Harrigan (2006:208) extended Tiwari’s 
argument by indicating that, irrespective of the level of international reserves or previous 
unstable inflation, a currency peg can be used as a nominal anchor. This suggests a 
pegged exchange rate is a workable exchange rate arrangement.    
 
Chow and Kim (2003:333) articulated Tiwari’s and Harrigan's arguments by stating that 
using a currency peg as nominal anchor serves as a stabilization policy for domestic 
prices in the economy. They argued that a nominal anchor would serve the purpose of 
price stabilization, irrespective of the economic status. Ghosh et al (1996:6) also support 
this argument by indicating that countries with low credibility can use a currency peg as 
an anti-inflationary policy. This is because a pegged exchange rate is often meant to 
import credibility into countries with a high inflation rate to effectively achieve a lower 
inflation rate (Mishkin, 1998:82).  
 
Alper and Ucer (1998:16) support Chow and Kim (2003:333) in stating that a pegged 
exchange rate arrangement can serve as nominal anchor, but cautioned that it would only 
be effective in the context of a credible program, given the well-known risks associated 
with “incredible” exchange rate based programs. This suggests that the effectiveness of a 
currency peg in bringing down inflation is subject to the strong commitment to maintain 
the peg (BON, 2000:24). For instance, a commitment to maintain the peg involves an 
obligation of the central bank to limit money creation to levels comparable to those of the 
country to whose its domestic currency is pegged (Mishkin, 2001:2). The pegged 
exchange rate becomes useful because money creation is associated with domestic 
inflation pressures. For example, governments’ budgetary pressures are often associated 
with expansionary monetary policies (Keller and Richardson, 2003:13-14; and Hoffmann, 
2007:425). Under a pegged exchange rate, excessive expansionary monetary policies are 
restrained. It is for this reason that a fixed nominal exchange rate is called an anchor 
 
 
 
 
 7
because it serves as a “commitment technology allowing the government to resist 
excessive expansionary policies” (Harrigan, 2006:208).  
 
A strong commitment also empowers a pegged exchange rate arrangement to provide a 
platform for the conduct of monetary policy that helps mitigate any inconsistencies 
resulting from discretionary policies (Todorovic and Djordjevic, 2007:32). Mishkin 
(1998:84) shares similar sentiments and illustrates the point that a pegged-exchange rate 
as nominal anchor can be thought of as a constraint on discretionary policy, that helps 
weaken the policy inconsistency problem. For example, it restrains monetary authorities 
from pursuing discretionary policies that are in favour of a successful short run outcome, 
but result in a poor long-run outcome such as high inflation (Mishkin, 1998:3). The 
preceding argument suggests that pegging does not automatically result in a low inflation 
rate, unless the authorities are committed to such an extent that they are not pursuing an 
excessive expansionary policy. It follows that, although the authorities in the domestic 
economy are committed, the pegged country suffers from an unstable inflation if the 
reserve country follows a negligent inflation policy (Harrigan, 2006:208).  
 
The commitment by authorities to a pegged exchange rate arrangement conveys credible 
signals about predictions of expected inflation (Velasco, 2000:3). It follows that under a 
pegged exchange rate arrangement, the prediction of inflation is so simple and clear that 
it is easily understood by the public (Giucci and Trebesch, 2004:3). Latter (2001:36) 
supports this argument by arguing that when economic agents understand the system; it 
enhances the credibility of the peg. That is why a currency peg as nominal anchor 
facilitates the convergence of policy targets in the domestic economy to the levels 
prevailing in the country of anchor, i.e. low inflation (Krueger, 1997:2).  
 
Todorovic and Djordjevic (2007:32) report a number of industrialised countries and 
emerging market countries that successfully used a pegged exchange rate as nominal 
anchor to control inflation. The industrialised countries include countries such as France 
and the United Kingdom that successfully used this strategy to lower inflation by tying 
the value of their currencies to the German mark. Emerging market countries such as 
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Argentina, on the other hand, which in 1991 established a currency board arrangement, 
required the central bank to exchange US dollars for new pesos at a fixed exchange rate 
of one-to-one. 
 
A pegged exchange rate has been successfully used to control inflation, but experiences 
with such an arrangement exhibit a number of constraints for domestic policymakers. The 
pegged exchange rate arrangement is “inherently fragile, for instance an attack on a 
pegged exchange rate can force the abandonment of the peg by stripping away the 
country’s foreign reserves” (McDonough, 1996, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/1996/sp961002.html). Another 
situation in which a pegged exchange rate might be constraining in controlling inflation, 
can be when the domestic conditions and exchange rate commitment diverge; for 
example, an open economy that is exposed to global capital markets are prone to 
speculative attacks (Giucci and Trebesch, 2004:3).  
 
It follows that if a pegged exchange rate arrangement shows a point of weakness, 
authorities are compelled to convince the public that they are willing and able to defend 
the fixed exchange rate (Velasco, 1999:3). One way in which the currency peg can be 
defended convincingly is by effecting commitment to both monetary and fiscal stability 
(i.e. not excessively expansionary policies), without which a fixed exchange rate cannot 
be sustained (McDonough, 1996, ditto). The commitment to monetary and fiscal stability 
is relatively effective when the country that is pegged, has an economy closely tied to the 
country to which it is pegging (Caramazza and Aziz, 1998:8). Therefore, this approach 
could be “worthwhile if a country is unable, for whatever reason, to make a credible 
commitment to price stability on a domestic basis alone” (McDonough, 1996, ditto). 
Nevertheless, in either situation, a country should choose a low-inflation anchor country 
to which it can peg its currency (Montiel, 2003:336). Alper and Ucer (1998:16) advance 
this argument by saying that a serious disinflation effort would need to use the nominal 
exchange rate as the anchor in a pegged exchange rate arrangement.  
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2.3.1 Empirical Literature 
 
Hamann (2001:134) critically looked at the stylized facts of exchange-rate-based 
stabilization and other stabilization plans where the exchange rate was not the anchor. 
The study assessed which of the stabilization policies (exchange rate targeting, monetary 
targeting and inflation targeting) provides the best nominal anchor.  The results show that 
exchange rate targeting (i.e. a pegged exchange rate arrangement) provide a more 
effective nominal anchor compared with other targets such as monetary and inflation 
targeting.  
 
Guomundsson et al (2001:41) analysed the appropriate exchange rate arrangement for 
Iceland, given its structural characteristics. They further looked at the rationale for the 
choice of currency peg and how successful it has been in achieving the goal of low 
inflation. The study finds that a pegged exchange rate has served the Icelandic economy 
very well. In fact, the pegged exchange rate arrangement enhanced the credibility of the 
goal of low inflation. The study finds that the currency peg played a major role in the 
disinflation process.  
 
Domac et al (2001:6) examined whether a country's exchange rate regime has an impact 
on inflation and growth performance in transition economies. The results show that the 
exchange rate regime does affect inflation performance. In particular, transition countries 
with intermediate exchange-rate arrangements might reduce inflation if they were to 
adopt a fixed regime. A series of tests showed that a pegged exchange rate arrangement 
succeeded in bringing inflation down. The authors drew a specific conclusion that the 
pegged exchange rate anchor as a nominal anchor in reducing inflation has been more 
effective than a monetary target.  
 
Ghosh et al (1997:3) looked at the influence of exchange rate regimes on macroeconomic 
performance, using “most comprehensive multi-country studies”. This study also 
employed a “comprehensive econometric framework and undertake several sensitivity 
and robustness tests”. The results from this study suggest that the inflation rate is 
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significantly lower under pegged exchange rates than under more flexible arrangements -
even after controlling for the effects of money growth and interest rate.  
 
Edwards (1993:39) studied whether the exchange rate regime has an impact on 
inflationary performance by introducing financial discipline. Using a sample from 52 
countries over the period 1980-89, the results showed that countries with a fixed 
exchange rate (including pegged exchange rate) had lower inflation rates during the 
1980s compared to countries with flexible arrangements. 
 
Whereas the studies discussed above all tended to support the view that a currency peg 
can be an effective nominal anchor, this need not always be the case. Quirk (1996: 43) 
already came to the conclusion more than a decade ago that various ambiguities in 
exchange rate regimes “… contribute to the difficulty of measuring and comparing the 
effects of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes on inflation performance. The various 
studies and approaches summarised below do not suggest definitive conclusions on the 
overall strengths of the two forms of regimes.” This cautions us not to draw general 
conclusions from the study of the impact of a currency peg on inflation in some specific 
countries. Rather, an empirical investigation of the effect of a currency peg must be 
undertaken for each specific country. This research paper does so for Namibia. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviewed related literature on currency pegs and inflation. The chapter began 
by defining a pegged exchange rate as a regime in which a domestic currency’s value is 
set equal to the value of another (foreign) currency or basket of currencies, artificially 
maintained by the government. Different levels of inflexibility of pegged exchange rate 
pegging were also discussed, whereby it was stated that they provide both a nominal and 
credible anchor for the economy. It was also shown that a credible peg implies 
commitment, which in itself conveys credible signals about predictions of expected 
inflation, i.e. lower domestic inflation due to low inflation expectations. The empirical 
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evidence referenced above has shown the potential of using a currency peg as a nominal 
anchor for curtailing inflation in both industrialized and emerging market countries. Thus, 
it demonstrates that a pegged exchange rate arrangement can be used as a nominal anchor 
to curtail inflation. Unfortunately, this does not allow us to draw the conclusion that the 
success of a currency peg is assured. Rather, as was suggested in the preceding section, 
any conclusion about the effectiveness of a currency peg must be based on empirical 
investigation for each country on its own. It is in this respect that this research paper 
hopes to make a modest contribution in the case of Namibia. Its simple objective is to test 
empirically the effectiveness of the currency peg for Namibia to keep inflation in 
Namibia at least comparable with that of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides details of the analytical framework applied in this study. A very 
brief review of various methodologies used in previous studies is presented in section 3.2. 
This is to contextualize the approach to this study. The discussion of this section is 
extended by presenting the methodology to be followed in this study, in particular, a 
specific analytical framework. Section 3.3 presents the data sources.  
 
3.2 Review of Methodologies 
 
The review of methodologies draws from the empirical studies presented as empirical 
literature in the preceding chapter. These studies tested whether using a pegged exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor is effective in curtailing inflation. This section outlines the 
methodology that was adopted to analyse the success of the currency peg.  
 
In their work Guomundsson et al (2001:16) studied the appropriate exchange rate 
arrangement for Iceland, the rationale for the choice of currency peg and how successful 
it has been in achieving the goal of low inflation. The study used the annual inflation data 
in comparing Iceland’s inflation rate in the pre-pegging and post-pegging period to that of 
the trading partner countries. The inflation rate data were tested for time series properties 
to determine if they are robust; in particular they were tested for stationarity and were 
found not to be stationary. These data were then transformed into their first differences in 
order to test the inflation rate differentials between Iceland and its trading partners for 
significance using the t-test. It turned out that inflation in Iceland remained lower than 
inflation in the partner countries. The authors then proceeded with the testing of 
correlation between exchange rate and inflation performance. This strengthened the claim 
that the pegged exchange rate was an effective anchor for inflation in Iceland because 
inflation in Iceland was reduced. This methodology could be appropriate for this study in 
two aspects. First, the annual inflation data used in their study are comparable to the data 
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to be used in this study. Secondly, these authors have addressed the question of how 
successful the peg has been in achieving the goal of low inflation in Iceland, which is 
similar to the question this study is examining for Namibia. 
 
In his work, Edwards (1993:36-39) studied whether the pegged exchange rate introduces 
financial discipline and thus impacts on inflation performance in the Latin American 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. The author used quarterly data to calculate 
the quarterly mean (average) and standard deviations of the four Latin American 
countries and compared the results to that of the US. The inflation data used for those 
countries were not corrected or treated for any statistical properties. However, the 
quarterly inflation data were tested for time series properties of stationarity and they were 
found not to be stationary. These data were then transformed into their first differences to 
become stationary using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root-test and the Ljung Box 
Statistics. The author used the quarterly inflation data to test the null hypothesis that 
inflation in the four Latin American countries does not deviate significantly from that of 
the United States, using the F- test. Unlike Edwards’s study, this study will not estimate 
an inflation model. Edwards's study did estimate a model because of the interest in other 
variables that affected the behaviour of the inflation rate differential between the US and 
the four Latin American countries. Thereafter a Chi-square test was used to test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of inflation of the four Latin American countries are not 
significantly different from that of the U.S. The Chi-square statistic was also used to test 
whether the pegged exchange rate has an impact on the stability of inflation experienced 
by the four Latin Americans.  
 
The work of Ghosh et al (1997:15) also studied the influence of exchange rate regimes on 
macroeconomic performance, employing a comprehensive econometric technique, 
sensitivity and robustness tests. The study involves a data set which covered nine 
exchange rate regimes for one hundred and forty countries over the period of thirty years 
(1960-1990). It was not stated if the data were corrected for any statistical properties such 
as stationarity. The authors proceeded with the calculation of the average (mean) inflation 
in these countries in order to compare inflation performance there. Since the nature of the 
 
 
 
 
 14
data is similar, the same procedure can be followed in this paper. The authors estimated 
two separate models, where inflation was regressed on two exchange rate regimes: the 
pegged and the intermediate exchange rate regimes. This is not applicable to this study 
because this study is not interested in comparing two exchange rate regimes. However, 
the t-statistic test used to test for correlation of significance for pegged exchange rate and 
low inflation is applicable. The coefficients of the exchange rate dummies were compared 
to determine which one is associated with lower inflation, and the pegged exchange rate 
turned out to be the strongest associated with lower inflation. This was to determine 
whether the peg was an effective anchor. A causal relationship between inflation and 
pegged exchange rate regime, following a two-stage least squares method, was tested. 
Although the modelling of causality test is relevant to this study the data to be used are 
not sufficient enough to carry out this kind of test. Therefore, the t-test will be conducted 
to test whether there is a statistically significant correlation between the inflation rates in 
the Namibia and South Africa.   
  
On the other hand, in their study, Domac et al (2001:24) also studied whether a country’s 
exchange rate has an impact on inflation and growth performance in transition 
economies. Using annual data of various macroeconomic indicators, of which inflation is 
among those selected, their mean (average) was computed. In particular, inflation under 
the pegged exchange rate regime was compared with other regimes. The authors tested 
the null hypothesis for no significant difference between the inflation rates. That is 
whether inflation in the country pegged, deviated significantly using the t-statistic test. 
This was to determine whether the pegged exchange rate regime was an effective nominal 
anchor for inflation in transition economies.  They further tested for correlation between 
exchange rate regimes and inflation performances. This was to determine the strength of 
the relationship between the two variables. This methodology will not be followed in this 
study because the authors used a multi-country study base. In addition, the authors were 
also interested in other factors that influence inflation. Therefore, an inflation equation 
was estimated, using a 2-stage least square method. This is because of the possibility of 
countries having switched exchange rate regimes. A switching regression model was 
estimated, using a two-step Heckman procedure. The first step of the Heckman procedure 
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is the ordered probit, which was used to estimate an equation for the choice of the 
exchange rate regime. The second step of the Heckman procedure is the switching 
regression technique, which was used to investigate whether the exchange rate regime has 
a bearing on inflation and growth performance in transition economies. The switching 
regression was employed to avoid the Lucas critique, “which postulates that when there is 
a policy switch the coefficients associated with policy variables should change” (Domac 
et al, 2001:31-32). This approach is not applicable to this paper as this study is not about 
change of exchange rate regimes and inflation.  
 
It emerges that different methodologies were followed in establishing whether a pegged 
exchange rate as an anchor has been effective in curtailing inflation (see Guomundsson et 
al, 2001:16; Domac et al, 2001:24; Ghosh et al, 1997:15 and Edwards, 1993:36-39). This 
includes both descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests.  
 
Based on various methods discussed above, this paper follows the studies that employed 
hypothesis testing, to determine whether a pegged exchange rate arrangement has been an 
effective nominal anchor. For this study the t-statistic (used by Domac et al (2001:24); 
and Edwards (1993:36-39)) will be used to test the hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference between the inflation rates of Namibia and SA. The nature (characteristics) of 
the data used in these studies is comparable with that for Namibia. The research question 
examined by these studies is similar to the research question of this paper: whether 
pegged exchange rate is an effective nominal anchor for lower inflation. The t-statistic 
will be used to test whether there is a statistical difference between the inflation rates of 
the two countries. The same test will also be conducted for growth in money stock; that 
is, whether growth in money stock in Namibia deviates from that of SA.  
 
These studies investigated a question which is similar to the one addressed in this paper, 
which is to determine whether a currency peg is an effective nominal anchor. The data 
used in the previous studies, is comparable to the Namibia data available. To test this 
hypothesis an ordinary least squares linear regression analysis will be performed to 
determine the correlation coefficient between the South African inflation rate (as 
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independent variable) and the Namibian inflation rate. The correlation coefficient will be 
tested for significance using the t-test. This is because of the small sample. Domac et al 
(2001:24), Edwards (1993:36-39) and Ghosh et al (1997:15) also followed the same 
procedure for small samples. It is assumed that their finding of normality also applies to 
the Namibian data. 
 
In addition to the correlation between the two inflation rates this study also follows the 
same methodology of determining the correlation coefficient with ordinary least squares 
regression to the money stock growth rates between the two countries. For the same 
reasons the t-test will then be used to test for significance. 
   
3.3 Data Sources  
 
This section presents a list of variables, their data sources and data series. Next to each 
variable are the data sources and the period for which the data are available. 
  
The focus of this study is to determine whether the pegged exchange rate has been an 
effective nominal anchor for Namibia’s prices. In the previous section Domac et al 
(2001:24) studied the impact of exchange rate arrangement on inflation performance, 
using annual inflation data as a basis for hypothesis testing, using the t-statistic. They 
were happy to use official inflation data in their study, and raised no potential difficulty 
with the use of such data. This study therefore also uses annual percentage changes in the 
CPI data for Namibia and SA, as a measure of the inflation rate. The CPI data for 
Namibia can be obtained from BON Annual Reports 1990-1991, 1996, 1999 -2002 and 
2004-2006, [Period: 1980-2006] and for South Africa from the South African Reserve 
Bank Website, [Period: 1980-2006]. 
 
The pegged exchange rate arrangement between the two countries has to be supported 
with monetary policy. In their study, Ghosh et al (1997:15) used the t-test on annual data 
of broad money growth. This study therefore also uses annual data, which is the 
percentage change of money stock. The money stock data for Namibia can be obtained 
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from BON Annual Reports 1996, 1999-2002 and 2004-2006, [Period: 1993-2006] and for 
South Africa from the South African Reserve Bank Website, [Period: 1993-2006]. 
Alternatively, one could use a t-test to test for no significant difference in the growth of 
money stock between the two countries, as used in Edwards (1993:36-39).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
AND INFLATION IN NAMIBIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analysis of exchange rate policy and inflation in Namibia. 
Section 4.2 presents some facts on inflation trends for the period 1980-2006 in the 
context created by factors such as monetary policy, fiscal policy and Balance of 
Payments flows. Section 4.3 presents the final remarks on the chapter. 
  
4.2 Inflation Trends: 1980 – 2006 
 
Graph 1: Namibia Inflation and South Africa Inflation: 1980 – 2006 
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Graph 1 shows the movements of the inflation rates from 1980 to 2006. Inflation is here 
defined as the annual percentage change in the CPI. CPINA therefore refers to the 
percentage change in the CPI for Namibia from one year to the next. CPISA is similarly 
defined for South Africa. The graph shows that the inflation rates of the two countries are 
moving in the same direction in most years. This pattern is attributed to the close trade 
integration of the economies of the two countries (Kalenga, 2001:8). For example, a high 
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proportion of consumer goods (used to determine the CPI) is imported from SA. There is 
evidence that SA accounts for more than 80 percent of Namibia’s imports (See table 1 
below).  
Table 1: Sources of Imports in 2003 
Country Import Values (N$ in millions) Share of total (%) 
SA 8532 80.4% 
Germany 249 2.3% 
Spain 144 1.4% 
China 136 1.3% 
UK 135 1.3% 
Namibia 109 1.0% 
Others 108 1.0% 
US 106 1.0% 
Morocco 77 0.7% 
Switzerland 76 0.7% 
Source: TIPS Report (the data are the most recent trade data that could be found) 
 
Table 1 above shows that Namibia receives more than 80 percent of its imports from SA. 
It follows that the prices of these SA imports will remain significant in determining 
domestic inflation. This might be one of the reasons why there are similar movements in 
the two inflation rates. This would strengthen the interpretation that the correlation 
between the two inflation rates exists because of the pegged exchange rate.  
 
The hypothesis of a positive relationship between the two inflation rates, as reflected in 
the correlation coefficient, can be tested with a t-test. The data values (change in CPI) 
have been transformed into natural logarithmic (ln) values, in order to make the 
relationship between the data more linear. In this respect this study follows the lead of 
Ghosh et al (1997:15). A scatter plot of the transformed data is presented in Figure 1 
below. In the figure lnCPINAM stands for the natural logarithmic of the annual 
percentage change in the CPI for Namibia and lnCPISA represents the natural 
logarithmic of the annual percentage change in the CPI for South Africa. 
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Figure 1: Scatter Diagram for the Natural Log of the Percentage Change in the 
CPI’s for Namibia and SA 
 
The scatter diagram suggests that there is a positive linear relationship. It is obviously not 
sufficient to draw conclusions regarding the linear relationship between the two inflation 
rates, based on the scatter diagram alone. The strength of the relationship can be obtained 
quantitatively by determining the correlation coefficient of the two inflation rates from 
the linear regression. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficient of the Natural Log of the Inflation Rates  
  lnCPINAM lnCPISA 
lnCPINAM 1  
lnCPISA 0.717893 1 
 
 
Table 2 above presents the result of the linear regression in the form of the value of 
correlation coefficient. This value should lie between -1 to +1. A value of correlation 
coefficient close to +1 indicates a strong positive linear relationship. This suggests that 
one variable increases as the other variable increases, while a value of correlation 
coefficient close to -1 indicates a strong negative linear relationship. The value of the 
correlation coefficient of the two inflation rates is 0.72, i.e. relatively close to +1, 
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indicating a strong positive linear relationship between the two inflation rates. It follows 
that Namibia’s inflation decreases with a decrease in SA inflation rate, or the opposite. 
The data show that inflation in both countries has been decreasing. Based on the 
correlation coefficient, one can confidently conclude that the two inflation rates are 
linearly related.  
 
The analysis requires as a next step a test whether there is indeed a statistically significant 
linear relationship between the two inflation rates. The null hypothesis is that the 
population correlation coefficient equals zero (0). The value of correlation coefficient can 
be compared with the critical values given in Table 1 in the Appendix. At the 5% level of 
significance, the computed value of the correlation coefficient is greater than the critical 
value of correlation coefficient. It follows that the null hypothesis can be rejected. There 
is sufficient evidence suggesting that the true population correlation coefficient is not 
equal to 0, and that there is a significant linear relationship between the two inflation 
rates. 
 
Although the hypothesis test of the correlation coefficient indicates whether there is a 
linear relationship, it gives no indication of the significance of that relationship. The 
strength of the statistical relationship between two inflation rates is tested to determine 
whether the two inflation rates are significantly correlated. The null hypothesis is that 
there is no significant statistical difference between the two inflation rates. This 
hypothesis test is conducted using the t-statistic test. The t-test is usually used when there 
is a small sample (number of observations) and in this case it applies. It also requires the 
assumption of normality. As already indicated, and following the research already done 
in other countries, this assumption is also made in this research paper.   
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Table 3: Statistical Test for Significance of the Positive Correlation between the two 
Inflation Ratesa  
   
   
  lnCPINAM lnCPISA 
Mean 1.98781682 1.775868771 
Variance 0.18856204 0.264441999 
Observations 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0.717893217  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 13  
t Stat 1.770933383  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.024137818  
t Critical one-tail 2.17954298  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.048275636  
t Critical two-tail 2.160368652   
a at 5% level of significance 
 
The results of the t-test summarised in Table 3 suggests the conclusion that the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation between the two inflation rates is rejected at 5% level of 
significance. It appears that the calculated value of t is less than the critical t-value. This 
suggests that there is no statistically significant difference between the two inflation rates 
of the two countries. Namibia’s inflation and SA’s inflation exhibit similar movements 
(see graph 1), therefore suggesting that Namibia’s inflation is anchored to that of SA 
through the exchange rate peg. This is confirmed as significant as there are no statitically 
significant differences. This gives an indication that the currency peg served as a nominal 
anchor. Because of the anchor, as the SA inflation rate came down, so did the Namibian 
inflation rate. This naturally was only analysed for the period after 1993 as before 1993 
Namibia was using the SA rand, which also implies that Namibia did not have its own 
monetary policy then. For the period post-1993, the similar movements in the two 
inflation rates could be explained at least 72% by the pegged exchange rate arrangement 
between Namibia and SA. The Namibian dollar has been pegged at the same rate to the 
rand for the past 15 years. This “nominal anchor” role of the pegged currency was 
supported by the harmonisation of monetary policy and underpinned by the high 
proportion of Namibian imports sourced from South Africa.  
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Monetary policy had to be implemented in order to maintain the pegged exchange rate. 
That means that the money stock growth rate in Namibia had to be maintained at a 
similar growth rate as in SA (BON, 1996:21-23). Namibian authorities would then be 
required to correct the money stock growth rate if there is deviation. 
 
Graph 2: Growth of Money Stock in Namibia and SA: 1993 – 2006 
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The growth of money stock (defined as the annual percentage change in money stock) in 
Namibia since 1993 is presented in Graph 2. It is compared to that of SA. The graph 
shows that the growth in money stock of the two countries are moving in the same 
direction in most years. This pattern is attributed to the harmonization of monetary policy 
of the two countries. 
 
The money stock is influenced by various factors, including open market operations of 
the central bank and financial flows into and out of the country. Monetary policy is 
precisely about how the central bank responds to these financial flows through its open 
market operations in order to achieve the money stock that its policy objective requires. A 
high correlation of money stock growth between the two countries would therefore 
suggest that the Namibian monetary authorities have conducted their open market 
operations in such a manner that the net effect on the growth of the money stock of 
Namibia would be for it to grow at more or less the same rate as the SA money stock. 
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For the same reasons similar transformations as were performed on the inflation data 
were performed on the money stock data for the two countries. In Table 4 below the 
variable lnMSNAM refers to the natural logarithm of the annual percentage change 
(growth rate) of the money stock in Namibia. Likewise, the variable lnMSSA refers to the 
natural logarithm of the annual percentage change (growth rate) of the money stock in 
South Africa. The null hypothesis is that the population correlation coefficient equals 
zero (0). 
 
Table 4: Statistical Test for the Natural Log of the Growth Rate in Money Stockb 
  
   
  lnMSNAM lnMSSA 
Mean 2.710261837 2.678603146 
Variance 0.344333202 0.110869727 
Observations 13 13 
Pearson Correlation 0.202726286  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 12  
t Stat 0.186157564  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.427715523  
t Critical one-tail 1.782287548  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.855431045  
t Critical two-tail 2.178812827   
b at 5% level of significance 
 
A t-statistic test is conducted to test whether the growth in money stock in Namibia 
deviates from the growth rate in money stock in SA. The null hypothesis is that there is a 
zero correlation between the growth of the money stock in Namibia and the growth of 
money stock in SA. The results for the t-test summarised in table 4 above indicate that at 
5% level of significance the null hypothesis can be rejected. It appears that the calculated 
value of t is less than the critical t-value. This suggests that there is indeed no significant 
difference in the growth rates in money stock of the two countries. This implies that 
money stock growth rate in Namibia has been maintained at a similar growth as in SA. It 
gives an indication that the authorities have maintained the peg through control of 
monetary growth. The results above suggest that the money stock in Namibia grew at the 
same rate over time, which also implies that the pegged exchange rate has been 
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maintained; hence a different inflation rate would not have been caused by a different rate 
of monetary growth.  
 
All the statistic test results above appear to be confidently suggesting that the pegged 
exchange rate arrangement between Namibia and SA has served as a nominal anchor for 
Namibia prices. The question remains whether the inflation rate could have been even 
lower if the peg were not in existence. More than 80 per cent of Namibia’s imports come 
from SA. Under the currency peg, authorities take measures to offset the tendency for the 
exchange rate to depreciate. If the peg did not exist, any other exchange rate arrangement 
(i.e. free-float) “will be skewed towards the rand because of the following reasons. 
Demand for rands in Namibia would continue to be strong, not only because of imports, 
but also because of portfolio flows into South Africa” (Kalenga, 2001:8). Therefore, it is 
difficult to conclude how other policy alternatives could have been pursued successfully 
at a lower cost than the pegged exchange rate arrangement. Therefore, it appears unlikely 
that the inflation rate might have been lower if another exchange rate regime had been 
adopted 
 
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter presented the analysis of exchange rate policy and inflation in Namibia. The 
summarised results above suggest that the pegged exchange rate has served as an 
effective nominal anchor. This “nominal anchor” role of the pegged currency was 
supported by the harmonisation of monetary policy and underpinned by the high 
proportion of Namibian imports sourced from South Africa. In fact, the Namibian dollar 
has been pegged to the rand for the past 15 years. The currency peg prompted authorities 
to take measures to offset any tendency towards exchange rate depreciation.  This 
strengthens the conclusion that the peg was an effective nominal anchor for price stability 
in the Namibian economy.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study focused on the impact of the Namibian dollar on its domestic inflation. The 
study illustrated that pegging the national currency to an international anchor currency 
may enhance the credibility of anti-inflation policy. This is because currency pegging 
means exchange rate pegging, which in turn provides a nominal anchor that can assist in 
controlling domestic inflation.  
 
The major concern with an exchange rate pegging arrangement is the fact that it is 
subjected to strong commitment. This involves an obligation by the central bank to limit 
money creation to levels comparable to those of the country to which its domestic 
currency is pegged, because money creation is associated with domestic inflation 
pressures. It is necessary for the central bank to do this under a pegged exchange rate as 
the economy will be as prone to inflationary pressures due to excessive expansionary 
polices as under any other exchange rage regime. Such expansionary policies would 
therefore undermine the fundamental purpose of exchange rate pegging and will therefore 
be contradictory with exchange rate pegging. Therefore exchange rate pegging compels 
the monetary authorities to show their commitment to the pegged exchange rate through 
the conduct of a monetary policy approach that will align the domestic growth in money 
supply with that of the country to whose currency the domestic currency is pegged. It is 
for this reason that a fixed nominal exchange rate is called an anchor because it restrains 
the monetary authorities from pursuing monetary policies that can accelerate the loss of 
value of the domestic currency. This also contributes to the conveyance of credible 
signals to economic agents. The information that this conveys to economic agents will 
also facilitate more stable inflationary expectations.  
 
This study showed that the exchange rate pegging arrangement between Namibia and 
South Africa served as a nominal anchor. Over time, inflation in SA has shown a 
decreasing trend and the Namibian inflation followed suit. In principle, because of the 
anchoring, there is supposed to be no difference between the two inflation rates. The 
statistical test confirmed this proposition. There was not statistical reason for rejecting the 
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null hypothesis that the two inflation rates moved in tandem with one another. If there 
was any statistical difference between the two inflation rates, it would suggest that the 
pegged exchange rate arrangement between the two countries did not serve as a nominal 
anchor.  In other words, a nominal anchor does not prevent inflation per se, but links the 
inflation rate to that of the anchor. Therefore, if the anchor goes down, so will the 
domestic inflation rate. 
 
 The study also demonstrated that monetary policy in Namibia has indeed been 
implemented in order to maintain the peg because money stock growth rate in Namibia 
has been kept at a similar growth rate as in SA. This was statistically tested, and if there 
was any deviation, Namibian authorities applied corrective measures. This indicates that 
the authorities have maintained the peg through the control of monetary growth; hence, a 
different inflation rate would not have been caused by a different rate of monetary 
growth. In other words, not only can it be argued that the pegged exchange rate was 
effective as a nominal anchor, but it can also be shown that the Bank of Namibia actively 
pursued monetary policies that ensured that effectiveness. It raises the interesting 
question, not to be answered in this thesis, which is the more important: The pegged 
exchange rate or the alignment of monetary policy with that of the country to which the 
currency is pegged?  
 
The study showed that exchange rate pegging has been effective to a certain extent. It 
would probably be difficult to argue that a differently pegged exchange rate or a flexible 
exchange rate would have resulted in an inflation rate for Namibia much lower than that 
of South Africa given the intensity of trade between the two countries. Over 80 percent of 
consumable goods of Namibia are imported from SA. Moreover, with the trade balance 
heavily in favour of South Africa there would most likely have been pressures over time 
for the Namibian dollar to depreciate. Under the currency peg, the authorities could offset 
the tendency for the exchange rate to depreciate. This may have been a significant 
consequence of the currency peg as the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account 
had to be financed by capital inflows. The likelihood of this happening would have been 
considerably undermined by a secularly depreciating currency, especially against the 
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South African rand as a substantial proportion of capital inflows into Namibia originated 
from South Africa. 
 
Therefore it can be confidently concluded in this study that exchange rate pegging of the 
Namibian dollar to the South African rand has been an effective nominal anchor. It 
therefore also arguably assisted in controlling domestic inflation in Namibia.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 
5% and 1% points for the distribution of the correlation coefficient under the null 
hypothesis that the population correlation is 0 in a two-tailed test 
 r values for two-tailed probabilities (P)  
Two-tailed 
probabilities (P) 
    
Sample size 0.05 0.01 Sample size 0.05 0.01 
 
3 1.00 1.00 23 0.41 0.53 
4 0.95 0.99 24 0.40 0.52 
5 0.88 0.96 25 0.40 0.51 
6 0.81 0.92 26 0.39 0.50 
7 0.75 0.87 27 0.38 0.49 
8 0.71 0.83 28 0.37 0.48 
9 0.67 0.80 29 0.37 0.47 
10 0.63 0.76 30 0.36 0.46 
11 0.60 0.73 40 0.31 0.40 
12 0.58 0.71 50 0.28 0.36 
13 0.55 0.68 60 0.25 0.33 
14 0.53 0.66 70 0.24 0.31 
15 0.51 0.64 80 0.22 0.29 
16 0.50 0.62 90 0.21 0.27 
17 0.48 0.61 100 0.20 0.26 
18 0.47 0.59 110 0.19 0.24 
19 0.46 0.58 120 0.18 0.23 
20 0.44 0.56 130 0.17 0.23 
21 0.43 0.55 140 0.17 0.22 
22 0.42 0.54 150 0.16 0.21 
 
Generated using the standard formula [2]. 
 
Source: http://ccforum.com/content/7/6/451 
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Table 2: CPI’s transformed to natural logarithmic values 
lnCPI(NAM) lnCPI(SA) 
2.525728644 2.5257286
2.694627181 2.7212954
2.740840024 2.6878475
2.48490665 2.5176965
2.208274414 2.442347
2.48490665 2.7911651
2.595254707 2.9231616
2.533696814 2.7788193
2.557227311 2.5572273
2.714694744 2.6878475
2.48490665 2.6672282
2.4765384 2.7278528
2.87356464 2.6390573
2.140066163 2.2925348
2.379546134 2.1747517
2.302585093 2.163323
2.079441542 1.9878743
2.186051277 2.1517622
1.824549292 1.9315214
2.151762203 1.6486586
2.224623552 1.686399
2.2300144 1.7404662
2.42568729 2.2192035
1.987874348 1.7578579
1.435084525 0.3364722
0.832909123 1.2237754
1.62924054 1.5475625
 
 
 
 
 
 
